openssl/test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
Viktor Dukhovni 0daccd4dc1 Check chain extensions also for trusted certificates
This includes basic constraints, key usages, issuer EKUs and auxiliary
trust OIDs (given a trust suitably related to the intended purpose).

Added tests and updated documentation.

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
2016-01-31 21:23:23 -05:00

119 lines
5.0 KiB
Perl

#! /usr/bin/perl
use strict;
use warnings;
use File::Spec::Functions qw/canonpath/;
use OpenSSL::Test qw/:DEFAULT top_file/;
setup("test_verify");
sub verify {
my ($cert, $purpose, $trusted, $untrusted, @opts) = @_;
my @args = qw(openssl verify -purpose);
my @path = qw(test certs);
push(@args, "$purpose", @opts);
for (@$trusted) { push(@args, "-trusted", top_file(@path, "$_.pem")) }
for (@$untrusted) { push(@args, "-untrusted", top_file(@path, "$_.pem")) }
push(@args, top_file(@path, "$cert.pem"));
run(app([@args]));
}
plan tests => 38;
# Canonical success
ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"]),
"verify valid chain");
# Root CA variants
ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-nonca)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
"Trusted CA certs now subject to CA:true checks");
ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert2)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
"fail wrong root key");
ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-name2)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
"fail wrong root DN");
ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root+serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
"accept right EKU");
ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root+anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
"accept anyEKU");
ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
"fail rejected EKU");
ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-anyEKU)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
"fail rejected anyEKU");
ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root+clientAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
"fail wrong EKU");
# Check that trusted-first is on by setting up paths to different roots
# depending on whether the intermediate is the trusted or untrusted one.
#
ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-serverAuth root-cert2 ca-root2)],
[qw(ca-cert)]),
"verify trusted-first path");
ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert root2+serverAuth ca-root2)],
[qw(ca-cert)]),
"verify trusted-first path right EKU");
ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert root2-serverAuth ca-root2)],
[qw(ca-cert)]),
"fail trusted-first path rejected EKU");
ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert root2+clientAuth ca-root2)],
[qw(ca-cert)]),
"fail trusted-first path wrong EKU");
# CA variants
ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-nonca)]),
"fail non-CA");
ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert2)]),
"fail wrong CA key");
ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-name2)]),
"fail wrong CA DN");
ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-root2)]),
"fail wrong CA issuer");
ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [], [qw(ca-cert)], "-partial_chain"),
"fail untrusted partial");
ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [], [qw(ca+serverAuth)], "-partial_chain"),
"fail untrusted EKU partial");
ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ca+serverAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"),
"accept trusted EKU partial");
ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ca-serverAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"),
"fail rejected EKU partial");
ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ca+clientAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"),
"fail wrong EKU partial");
# We now test auxiliary trust even for intermediate trusted certs without
# -partial_chain. Note that "-trusted_first" is now always on and cannot
# be disabled.
ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert ca+serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
"accept trusted EKU");
ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert ca-serverAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
"fail rejected EKU");
ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert ca+clientAuth)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
"fail wrong EKU");
# EE variants
ok(verify("ee-client", "sslclient", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
"accept client cert");
ok(!verify("ee-client", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
"fail wrong leaf purpose");
ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslclient", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
"fail wrong leaf purpose");
ok(!verify("ee-cert2", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
"fail wrong CA key");
ok(!verify("ee-name2", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
"fail wrong CA name");
ok(!verify("ee-expired", "sslserver", [qw(root-cert)], [qw(ca-cert)]),
"fail expired leaf");
ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ee-cert)], [], "-partial_chain"),
"accept last-resort direct leaf match");
ok(verify("ee-client", "sslclient", [qw(ee-client)], [], "-partial_chain"),
"accept last-resort direct leaf match");
ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ee-client)], [], "-partial_chain"),
"fail last-resort direct leaf non-match");
ok(verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ee+serverAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"),
"accept direct match with trusted EKU");
ok(!verify("ee-cert", "sslserver", [qw(ee-serverAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"),
"reject direct match with rejected EKU");
ok(verify("ee-client", "sslclient", [qw(ee+clientAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"),
"accept direct match with trusted EKU");
ok(!verify("ee-client", "sslclient", [qw(ee-clientAuth)], [], "-partial_chain"),
"reject direct match with rejected EKU");