Augment RSA provider to generate CRT coefficients on EVP_PKEY_fromdata()
It would be helpful to be able to generate RSA's dmp1/dmq1/iqmp values when not provided in the param list to EVP_PKEY_fromdata. Augment the provider in ossl_rsa_fromdata to preform this generation iff: a) At least p q n e and e are provided b) the new parameter OSSL_PARAM_RSA_DERIVE_PQ is set to 1 Fixes #21826 Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21875)
This commit is contained in:
parent
0a22436ea5
commit
f3be536686
@ -80,6 +80,12 @@ OpenSSL 3.2
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### Changes between 3.1 and 3.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
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* The EVP_PKEY_fromdata function has been augmented to allow for the derivation
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of CRT (Chinese Remainder Theorem) parameters when requested. See the
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OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DERIVE_FROM_PQ param in the EVP_PKEY-RSA documentation.
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*Neil Horman*
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* The BLAKE2b hash algorithm supports a configurable output length
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by setting the "size" parameter.
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@ -64,22 +64,56 @@ static int collect_numbers(STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *numbers,
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int ossl_rsa_fromdata(RSA *rsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[], int include_private)
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{
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const OSSL_PARAM *param_n, *param_e, *param_d = NULL;
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BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL;
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const OSSL_PARAM *param_p, *param_q = NULL;
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const OSSL_PARAM *param_derive = NULL;
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BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL;
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STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *factors = NULL, *exps = NULL, *coeffs = NULL;
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int is_private = 0;
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int derive_from_pq = 0;
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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if (rsa == NULL)
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return 0;
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param_n = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N);
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param_e = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E);
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if (include_private)
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param_d = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D);
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if ((param_n != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_n, &n))
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|| (param_e != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_e, &e))
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|| (param_d != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_d, &d)))
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if ((param_n == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_n, &n))
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|| (param_e == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_e, &e))) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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goto err;
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}
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if (include_private) {
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param_derive = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
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OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DERIVE_FROM_PQ);
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if ((param_derive != NULL)
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&& !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(param_derive, &derive_from_pq))
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goto err;
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param_d = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D);
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if (param_d != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_d, &d)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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goto err;
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}
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if (derive_from_pq) {
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ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(rsa->libctx);
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if (ctx == NULL)
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goto err;
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/* we need at minimum p, q */
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param_p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1);
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param_q = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2);
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if ((param_p == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_p, &p))
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|| (param_q == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(param_q, &q))) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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}
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is_private = (d != NULL);
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@ -96,25 +130,121 @@ int ossl_rsa_fromdata(RSA *rsa, const OSSL_PARAM params[], int include_private)
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ossl_rsa_mp_coeff_names))
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goto err;
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/* It's ok if this private key just has n, e and d */
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if (derive_from_pq && sk_BIGNUM_num(exps) == 0
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&& sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) == 0) {
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/*
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* If we want to use crt to derive our exponents/coefficients, we
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* need to have at least 2 factors
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*/
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if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) < 2) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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goto err;
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}
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/*
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* if we have more than two factors, n and d must also have
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* been provided
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*/
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if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) > 2
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&& (param_n == NULL || param_d == NULL)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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goto err;
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}
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/* build our exponents and coefficients here */
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if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) == 2) {
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/* for 2 factors we can use the sp800 functions to do this */
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if (!RSA_set0_factors(rsa, sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, 0),
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sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, 1))) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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/*
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* once consumed by RSA_set0_factors, pop those off the stack
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* so we don't free them below
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*/
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sk_BIGNUM_pop(factors);
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sk_BIGNUM_pop(factors);
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/*
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* Note: Because we only have 2 factors here, there will be no
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* additional pinfo fields to hold additional factors, and
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* since we set our key and 2 factors above we can skip
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* the call to ossl_rsa_set0_all_params
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*/
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if (!ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_derive_params_from_pq(rsa,
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RSA_bits(rsa),
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NULL, ctx)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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} else {
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#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
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/*
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* in the multiprime case we have to generate exps/coeffs here
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* for each additional prime
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*/
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if (!ossl_rsa_multiprime_derive(rsa, RSA_bits(rsa),
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sk_BIGNUM_num(factors),
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rsa->e, factors, exps,
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coeffs)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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/*
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* Now we should have all our factors, exponents and
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* coefficients
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*/
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if (!ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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#else
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/* multiprime case is disallowed in FIPS mode, raise an error */
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
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goto err;
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#endif
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}
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} else {
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/*
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* It's ok if this private key just has n, e and d
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* but only if we're not using derive_from_pq
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*/
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if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) != 0
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&& !ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(rsa, factors, exps, coeffs))
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goto err;
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}
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/* sanity check to ensure we used everything in our stacks */
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if (sk_BIGNUM_num(factors) != 0
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|| sk_BIGNUM_num(exps) != 0
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|| sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) != 0) {
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ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR,
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"There are %d, %d, %d elements left on our factors, exps, coeffs stacks\n",
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sk_BIGNUM_num(factors), sk_BIGNUM_num(exps),
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sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs));
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goto err;
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}
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}
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BN_clear_free(p);
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BN_clear_free(q);
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sk_BIGNUM_free(factors);
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sk_BIGNUM_free(exps);
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sk_BIGNUM_free(coeffs);
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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return 1;
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err:
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BN_free(n);
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BN_free(e);
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BN_free(d);
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sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(factors, BN_free);
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sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(exps, BN_free);
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sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(coeffs, BN_free);
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sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(factors, BN_clear_free);
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sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(exps, BN_clear_free);
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sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(coeffs, BN_clear_free);
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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return 0;
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}
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@ -71,15 +71,201 @@ int RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
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return rsa_keygen(rsa->libctx, rsa, bits, primes, e_value, cb, 0);
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}
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DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM)
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/*
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* Given input values, q, p, n, d and e, derive the exponents
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* and coefficients for each prime in this key, placing the result
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* on their respective exps and coeffs stacks
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*/
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#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
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int ossl_rsa_multiprime_derive(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
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BIGNUM *e_value,
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STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *factors,
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STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps,
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STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs)
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{
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STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *pplist = NULL, *pdlist = NULL;
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BIGNUM *factor = NULL, *newpp = NULL, *newpd = NULL;
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BIGNUM *dval = NULL, *newexp = NULL, *newcoeff = NULL;
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BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
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BIGNUM *dmp1 = NULL, *dmq1 = NULL, *iqmp = NULL;
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BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL;
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
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int i;
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int ret = 0;
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ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(rsa->libctx);
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if (ctx == NULL)
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goto err;
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BN_CTX_start(ctx);
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pplist = sk_BIGNUM_new_null();
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if (pplist == NULL)
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goto err;
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pdlist = sk_BIGNUM_new_null();
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if (pdlist == NULL)
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goto err;
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r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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if (r2 == NULL)
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goto err;
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BN_set_flags(r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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BN_set_flags(r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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if (BN_copy(r1, rsa->n) == NULL)
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goto err;
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p = sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, 0);
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q = sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, 1);
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/* Build list of partial products of primes */
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for (i = 0; i < sk_BIGNUM_num(factors); i++) {
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switch (i) {
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case 0:
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/* our first prime, p */
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if (!BN_sub(r2, p, BN_value_one()))
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goto err;
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BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) == NULL)
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goto err;
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break;
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case 1:
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/* second prime q */
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if (!BN_mul(r1, p, q, ctx))
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goto err;
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tmp = BN_dup(r1);
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if (tmp == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (!sk_BIGNUM_insert(pplist, tmp, sk_BIGNUM_num(pplist)))
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goto err;
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break;
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default:
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factor = sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, i);
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/* all other primes */
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if (!BN_mul(r1, r1, factor, ctx))
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goto err;
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tmp = BN_dup(r1);
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if (tmp == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (!sk_BIGNUM_insert(pplist, tmp, sk_BIGNUM_num(pplist)))
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goto err;
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break;
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}
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}
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/* build list of relative d values */
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/* p -1 */
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if (!BN_sub(r1, p, BN_value_one()))
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goto err;
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if (!BN_sub(r2, q, BN_value_one()))
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goto err;
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if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx))
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goto err;
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for (i = 2; i < sk_BIGNUM_num(factors); i++) {
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factor = sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, i);
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dval = BN_new();
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if (dval == NULL)
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goto err;
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BN_set_flags(dval, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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if (!BN_sub(dval, factor, BN_value_one()))
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goto err;
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if (!BN_mul(r0, r0, dval, ctx))
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goto err;
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if (!sk_BIGNUM_insert(pdlist, dval, sk_BIGNUM_num(pdlist)))
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goto err;
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}
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/* Calculate dmp1, dmq1 and additional exponents */
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dmp1 = BN_secure_new();
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if (dmp1 == NULL)
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goto err;
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dmq1 = BN_secure_new();
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if (dmq1 == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (!BN_mod(dmp1, rsa->d, r1, ctx))
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goto err;
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if (!sk_BIGNUM_insert(exps, dmp1, sk_BIGNUM_num(exps)))
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goto err;
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dmp1 = NULL;
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if (!BN_mod(dmq1, rsa->d, r2, ctx))
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goto err;
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if (!sk_BIGNUM_insert(exps, dmq1, sk_BIGNUM_num(exps)))
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goto err;
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dmq1 = NULL;
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for (i = 2; i < sk_BIGNUM_num(factors); i++) {
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newpd = sk_BIGNUM_value(pdlist, i - 2);
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newexp = BN_new();
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if (newexp == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (!BN_mod(newexp, rsa->d, newpd, ctx)) {
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BN_free(newexp);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!sk_BIGNUM_insert(exps, newexp, sk_BIGNUM_num(exps)))
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goto err;
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}
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/* Calculate iqmp and additional coefficients */
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iqmp = BN_new();
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if (iqmp == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (BN_mod_inverse(iqmp, sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, 1),
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sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, 0), ctx) == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (!sk_BIGNUM_insert(coeffs, iqmp, sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs)))
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goto err;
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iqmp = NULL;
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for (i = 2; i < sk_BIGNUM_num(factors); i++) {
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newpp = sk_BIGNUM_value(pplist, i - 2);
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newcoeff = BN_new();
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if (newcoeff == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (BN_mod_inverse(newcoeff, newpp, sk_BIGNUM_value(factors, i),
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ctx) == NULL) {
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BN_free(newcoeff);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!sk_BIGNUM_insert(coeffs, newcoeff, sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs)))
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goto err;
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}
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ret = 1;
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err:
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sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(pplist, BN_free);
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sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(pdlist, BN_free);
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BN_CTX_end(ctx);
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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BN_clear_free(dmp1);
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BN_clear_free(dmq1);
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BN_clear_free(iqmp);
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return ret;
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}
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static int rsa_multiprime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
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BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
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{
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BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *tmp, *prime;
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BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *tmp, *tmp2, *prime;
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int n = 0, bitsr[RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM], bitse = 0;
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int i = 0, quo = 0, rmd = 0, adj = 0, retries = 0;
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RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL;
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STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos = NULL;
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STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *factors = NULL;
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STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps = NULL;
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STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs = NULL;
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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BN_ULONG bitst = 0;
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unsigned long error = 0;
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@ -104,6 +290,18 @@ static int rsa_multiprime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
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return 0;
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}
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factors = sk_BIGNUM_new_null();
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if (factors == NULL)
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return 0;
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exps = sk_BIGNUM_new_null();
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if (exps == NULL)
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goto err;
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coeffs = sk_BIGNUM_new_null();
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if (coeffs == NULL)
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goto err;
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ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(rsa->libctx);
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if (ctx == NULL)
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goto err;
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@ -137,15 +335,6 @@ static int rsa_multiprime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
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if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
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goto err;
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BN_set_flags(rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
BN_set_flags(rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
BN_set_flags(rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
BN_set_flags(rsa->iqmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
|
||||
/* initialize multi-prime components */
|
||||
if (primes > RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM) {
|
||||
@ -250,8 +439,14 @@ static int rsa_multiprime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
|
||||
/* i == 0, do nothing */
|
||||
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, i))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
tmp = BN_dup(prime);
|
||||
if (tmp == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!sk_BIGNUM_insert(factors, tmp, sk_BIGNUM_num(factors)))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* if |r1|, product of factors so far, is not as long as expected
|
||||
* (by checking the first 4 bits are less than 0x9 or greater than
|
||||
@ -298,6 +493,10 @@ static int rsa_multiprime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
|
||||
*/
|
||||
i = -1;
|
||||
bitse = 0;
|
||||
sk_BIGNUM_pop_free(factors, BN_clear_free);
|
||||
factors = sk_BIGNUM_new_null();
|
||||
if (factors == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
retries++;
|
||||
@ -310,12 +509,20 @@ static int rsa_multiprime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, i))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
tmp = BN_dup(prime);
|
||||
if (tmp == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!sk_BIGNUM_insert(factors, tmp, sk_BIGNUM_num(factors)))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
|
||||
tmp = rsa->p;
|
||||
rsa->p = rsa->q;
|
||||
rsa->q = tmp;
|
||||
/* mirror this in our factor stack */
|
||||
if (!sk_BIGNUM_insert(factors, sk_BIGNUM_delete(factors, 0), 1))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* calculate d */
|
||||
@ -339,79 +546,51 @@ static int rsa_multiprime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
BIGNUM *pr0 = BN_new();
|
||||
|
||||
if (pr0 == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx)) {
|
||||
BN_free(pr0);
|
||||
BN_set_flags(r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
if (BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, r0, ctx) == NULL) {
|
||||
goto err; /* d */
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* We MUST free pr0 before any further use of r0 */
|
||||
BN_free(pr0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
|
||||
|
||||
if (d == NULL)
|
||||
/* derive any missing exponents and coefficients */
|
||||
if (!ossl_rsa_multiprime_derive(rsa, bits, primes, e_value,
|
||||
factors, exps, coeffs))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
|
||||
/* calculate d mod (p-1) and d mod (q - 1) */
|
||||
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx)
|
||||
|| !BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx)) {
|
||||
BN_free(d);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* calculate CRT exponents */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* first 2 factors/exps are already tracked in p/q/dmq1/dmp1
|
||||
* and the first coeff is in iqmp, so pop those off the stack
|
||||
* Note, the first 2 factors/exponents are already tracked by p and q
|
||||
* assign dmp1/dmq1 and iqmp
|
||||
* the remaining pinfo values are separately allocated, so copy and delete
|
||||
* those
|
||||
*/
|
||||
BN_clear_free(sk_BIGNUM_delete(factors, 0));
|
||||
BN_clear_free(sk_BIGNUM_delete(factors, 0));
|
||||
rsa->dmp1 = sk_BIGNUM_delete(exps, 0);
|
||||
rsa->dmq1 = sk_BIGNUM_delete(exps, 0);
|
||||
rsa->iqmp = sk_BIGNUM_delete(coeffs, 0);
|
||||
for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) {
|
||||
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2);
|
||||
/* pinfo->d == r_i - 1 */
|
||||
if (!BN_mod(pinfo->d, d, pinfo->d, ctx)) {
|
||||
BN_free(d);
|
||||
tmp = sk_BIGNUM_delete(factors, 0);
|
||||
BN_copy(pinfo->r, tmp);
|
||||
BN_clear_free(tmp);
|
||||
tmp = sk_BIGNUM_delete(exps, 0);
|
||||
tmp2 = BN_copy(pinfo->d, tmp);
|
||||
BN_clear_free(tmp);
|
||||
if (tmp2 == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
tmp = sk_BIGNUM_delete(coeffs, 0);
|
||||
tmp2 = BN_copy(pinfo->t, tmp);
|
||||
BN_clear_free(tmp);
|
||||
if (tmp2 == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */
|
||||
BN_free(d);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
BIGNUM *p = BN_new();
|
||||
|
||||
if (p == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
|
||||
/* calculate inverse of q mod p */
|
||||
if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx)) {
|
||||
BN_free(p);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* calculate CRT coefficient for other primes */
|
||||
for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) {
|
||||
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2);
|
||||
BN_with_flags(p, pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
if (!BN_mod_inverse(pinfo->t, pinfo->pp, p, ctx)) {
|
||||
BN_free(p);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* We MUST free p before any further use of rsa->p */
|
||||
BN_free(p);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ok = 1;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
sk_BIGNUM_free(factors);
|
||||
sk_BIGNUM_free(exps);
|
||||
sk_BIGNUM_free(coeffs);
|
||||
if (ok == -1) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
||||
ok = 0;
|
||||
|
@ -744,9 +744,13 @@ int RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int optype, int cmd, int p1, void *p2)
|
||||
|
||||
DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM)
|
||||
|
||||
int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
|
||||
const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps,
|
||||
const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs)
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Note: This function deletes values from the parameter
|
||||
* stack values as they are consumed and set in the RSA key.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
|
||||
STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps,
|
||||
STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
||||
STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old_infos = NULL;
|
||||
@ -757,6 +761,8 @@ int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
pnum = sk_BIGNUM_num(primes);
|
||||
|
||||
/* we need at least 2 primes */
|
||||
if (pnum < 2)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -764,6 +770,17 @@ int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
|
||||
sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, 1)))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* if we managed to set everything above, remove those elements from the
|
||||
* stack
|
||||
* Note, we do this after the above all to ensure that we have taken
|
||||
* ownership of all the elements in the RSA key to avoid memory leaks
|
||||
* we also use delete 0 here as we are grabbing items from the end of the
|
||||
* stack rather than the start, otherwise we could use pop
|
||||
*/
|
||||
sk_BIGNUM_delete(primes, 0);
|
||||
sk_BIGNUM_delete(primes, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
if (pnum == sk_BIGNUM_num(exps)
|
||||
&& pnum == sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) + 1) {
|
||||
|
||||
@ -771,6 +788,11 @@ int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
|
||||
sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, 1),
|
||||
sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, 0)))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* as above, once we consume the above params, delete them from the list */
|
||||
sk_BIGNUM_delete(exps, 0);
|
||||
sk_BIGNUM_delete(exps, 0);
|
||||
sk_BIGNUM_delete(coeffs, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
|
||||
@ -786,9 +808,9 @@ int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 2; i < pnum; i++) {
|
||||
BIGNUM *prime = sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, i);
|
||||
BIGNUM *exp = sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, i);
|
||||
BIGNUM *coeff = sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, i - 1);
|
||||
BIGNUM *prime = sk_BIGNUM_pop(primes);
|
||||
BIGNUM *exp = sk_BIGNUM_pop(exps);
|
||||
BIGNUM *coeff = sk_BIGNUM_pop(coeffs);
|
||||
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ossl_assert(prime != NULL && exp != NULL && coeff != NULL))
|
||||
|
@ -150,6 +150,10 @@ struct rsa_meth_st {
|
||||
/* Macros to test if a pkey or ctx is for a PSS key */
|
||||
#define pkey_is_pss(pkey) (pkey->ameth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
|
||||
#define pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx) (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
|
||||
int ossl_rsa_multiprime_derive(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
|
||||
BIGNUM *e_value,
|
||||
STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *factors, STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps,
|
||||
STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs);
|
||||
|
||||
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *ossl_rsa_pss_params_create(const EVP_MD *sigmd,
|
||||
const EVP_MD *mgf1md, int saltlen);
|
||||
|
@ -228,13 +228,16 @@ static int rsa_validate_rng_strength(EVP_RAND_CTX *rng, int nbits)
|
||||
* Returns: -1 = error,
|
||||
* 0 = d is too small,
|
||||
* 1 = success.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* SP800-56b key generation always passes a non NULL value for e.
|
||||
* For other purposes, if e is NULL then it is assumed that e, n and d are
|
||||
* already set in the RSA key and do not need to be recalculated.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_derive_params_from_pq(RSA *rsa, int nbits,
|
||||
const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret = -1;
|
||||
BIGNUM *p1, *q1, *lcm, *p1q1, *gcd;
|
||||
|
||||
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
|
||||
p1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
q1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
@ -254,6 +257,10 @@ int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_derive_params_from_pq(RSA *rsa, int nbits,
|
||||
if (ossl_rsa_get_lcm(ctx, rsa->p, rsa->q, lcm, gcd, p1, q1, p1q1) != 1)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* if e is provided as a parameter, don't recompute e, d or n
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (e != NULL) {
|
||||
/* copy e */
|
||||
BN_free(rsa->e);
|
||||
rsa->e = BN_dup(e);
|
||||
@ -280,6 +287,7 @@ int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_derive_params_from_pq(RSA *rsa, int nbits,
|
||||
rsa->n = BN_new();
|
||||
if (rsa->n == NULL || !BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* (Step 5a) dP = d mod (p-1) */
|
||||
if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL)
|
||||
|
@ -132,6 +132,15 @@ The RSA "e" value. The value may be any odd number greater than or equal to
|
||||
65537. The default value is 65537.
|
||||
For legacy reasons a value of 3 is currently accepted but is deprecated.
|
||||
|
||||
=item "rsa-derive-from-pq" (B<OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DERIVE_FROM_PQ>) <unsigned integer>
|
||||
|
||||
Indicate that missing parameters not passed in the parameter list should be
|
||||
derived if not provided. Setting a nonzero value will cause all
|
||||
needed exponents and coefficients to be derived if not available. Setting this
|
||||
option requires at least OSSL_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1, OSSL_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2,
|
||||
and OSSL_PARAM_RSA_N to be provided. This option is ignored if
|
||||
OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY is not set in the selection parameter.
|
||||
|
||||
=back
|
||||
|
||||
=head2 RSA key generation parameters for FIPS module testing
|
||||
|
@ -54,9 +54,9 @@ RSA *ossl_rsa_new_with_ctx(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
|
||||
OSSL_LIB_CTX *ossl_rsa_get0_libctx(RSA *r);
|
||||
void ossl_rsa_set0_libctx(RSA *r, OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx);
|
||||
|
||||
int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
|
||||
const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps,
|
||||
const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs);
|
||||
int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes,
|
||||
STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps,
|
||||
STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs);
|
||||
int ossl_rsa_get0_all_params(RSA *r, STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *primes,
|
||||
STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps,
|
||||
STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs);
|
||||
|
@ -3080,6 +3080,70 @@ static int test_RSA_OAEP_set_null_label(void)
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
|
||||
static int test_RSA_legacy(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
BIGNUM *p = NULL;
|
||||
BIGNUM *q = NULL;
|
||||
BIGNUM *n = NULL;
|
||||
BIGNUM *e = NULL;
|
||||
BIGNUM *d = NULL;
|
||||
const EVP_MD *md = EVP_sha256();
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
|
||||
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
||||
RSA *rsa = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (nullprov != NULL)
|
||||
return TEST_skip("Test does not support a non-default library context");
|
||||
|
||||
if (!TEST_ptr(p = BN_dup(BN_value_one()))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(q = BN_dup(BN_value_one()))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(n = BN_dup(BN_value_one()))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(e = BN_dup(BN_value_one()))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(d = BN_dup(BN_value_one())))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!TEST_ptr(rsa = RSA_new())
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(pkey = EVP_PKEY_new())
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!TEST_true(RSA_set0_factors(rsa, p, q)))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
p = NULL;
|
||||
q = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!TEST_true(RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, d)))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
n = NULL;
|
||||
e = NULL;
|
||||
d = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa)))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
rsa = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!TEST_true(EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey)))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
RSA_free(rsa);
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
||||
BN_free(p);
|
||||
BN_free(q);
|
||||
BN_free(n);
|
||||
BN_free(e);
|
||||
BN_free(d);
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305)
|
||||
static int test_decrypt_null_chunks(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@ -5520,6 +5584,9 @@ int setup_tests(void)
|
||||
ADD_TEST(test_RSA_get_set_params);
|
||||
ADD_TEST(test_RSA_OAEP_set_get_params);
|
||||
ADD_TEST(test_RSA_OAEP_set_null_label);
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
|
||||
ADD_TEST(test_RSA_legacy);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305)
|
||||
ADD_TEST(test_decrypt_null_chunks);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
@ -429,7 +429,8 @@ static int test_fromdata_rsa(void)
|
||||
/* for better diagnostics always compare key params */
|
||||
for (i = 0; fromdata_params[i].key != NULL; ++i) {
|
||||
if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(bn_from, key_numbers[i]))
|
||||
|| !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pk, fromdata_params[i].key, &bn))
|
||||
|| !TEST_true(EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pk, fromdata_params[i].key,
|
||||
&bn))
|
||||
|| !TEST_BN_eq(bn, bn_from))
|
||||
ret = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -443,6 +444,397 @@ static int test_fromdata_rsa(void)
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
struct check_data {
|
||||
const char *pname;
|
||||
BIGNUM *comparebn;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static int do_fromdata_rsa_derive(OSSL_PARAM *fromdata_params,
|
||||
struct check_data check[],
|
||||
int expected_nbits, int expected_sbits,
|
||||
int expected_ksize)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const OSSL_PARAM *check_param = NULL;
|
||||
BIGNUM *check_bn = NULL;
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM *todata_params = NULL;
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL, *key_ctx = NULL;
|
||||
EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL, *copy_pk = NULL, *dup_pk = NULL;
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!TEST_ptr(ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "RSA", NULL))
|
||||
|| !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx), 1)
|
||||
|| !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pk, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR,
|
||||
fromdata_params), 1))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* get the generated key parameters back and validate that the
|
||||
* exponents/coeffs are correct
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_todata(pk, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, &todata_params), 1))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; check[i].pname != NULL; i++) {
|
||||
if (!TEST_ptr(check_param = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(todata_params,
|
||||
check[i].pname)))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!TEST_int_eq(OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(check_param, &check_bn), 1))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!TEST_BN_eq(check_bn, check[i].comparebn)) {
|
||||
TEST_info("Data mismatch for parameter %s", check[i].pname);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
BN_free(check_bn);
|
||||
check_bn = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
while (dup_pk == NULL) {
|
||||
if (!TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_get_bits(pk), expected_nbits)
|
||||
|| !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pk), expected_sbits)
|
||||
|| !TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_get_size(pk), expected_ksize)
|
||||
|| !TEST_false(EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pk)))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(key_ctx);
|
||||
if (!TEST_ptr(key_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pk, "")))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_check(key_ctx), 0)
|
||||
|| !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_public_check(key_ctx), 0)
|
||||
|| !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_private_check(key_ctx), 0)
|
||||
|| !TEST_int_gt(EVP_PKEY_pairwise_check(key_ctx), 0))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
/* EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters() should fail for RSA */
|
||||
if (!TEST_ptr(copy_pk = EVP_PKEY_new())
|
||||
|| !TEST_false(EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(copy_pk, pk)))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_free(copy_pk);
|
||||
copy_pk = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!TEST_ptr(dup_pk = EVP_PKEY_dup(pk)))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_eq(pk, dup_pk), 1)) {
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_free(dup_pk);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
|
||||
pk = dup_pk;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
BN_free(check_bn);
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(key_ctx);
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_free(fromdata_params);
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_free(todata_params);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int test_fromdata_rsa_derive_from_pq_sp800(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld = NULL;
|
||||
BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL, *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
|
||||
BIGNUM *dmp1 = NULL, *dmq1 = NULL, *iqmp = NULL;
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM *fromdata_params = NULL;
|
||||
struct check_data cdata[4];
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* 512-bit RSA key, extracted from this command,
|
||||
* openssl genrsa 512 | openssl rsa -text
|
||||
* Note: When generating a key with EVP_PKEY_fromdata, and using
|
||||
* crt derivation, openssl requires a minimum of 512 bits of n data,
|
||||
* and 2048 bits in the FIPS case
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static unsigned char n_data[] =
|
||||
{0x00, 0xc7, 0x06, 0xd8, 0x6b, 0x3c, 0x4f, 0xb7, 0x95, 0x42, 0x44, 0x90,
|
||||
0xbd, 0xef, 0xf3, 0xc4, 0xb5, 0xa8, 0x55, 0x9e, 0x33, 0xa3, 0x04, 0x3a,
|
||||
0x90, 0xe5, 0x13, 0xff, 0x87, 0x69, 0x15, 0xa4, 0x8a, 0x17, 0x10, 0xcc,
|
||||
0xdf, 0xf9, 0xc5, 0x0f, 0xf1, 0x12, 0xff, 0x12, 0x11, 0xe5, 0x6b, 0x5c,
|
||||
0x83, 0xd9, 0x43, 0xd1, 0x8a, 0x7e, 0xa6, 0x60, 0x07, 0x2e, 0xbb, 0x03,
|
||||
0x17, 0x2d, 0xec, 0x17, 0x87};
|
||||
static unsigned char e_data[] = {0x01, 0x00, 0x01};
|
||||
static unsigned char d_data[] =
|
||||
{0x1e, 0x5e, 0x5d, 0x07, 0x7f, 0xdc, 0x6a, 0x16, 0xcc, 0x55, 0xca, 0x00,
|
||||
0x31, 0x6c, 0xf0, 0xc7, 0x07, 0x38, 0x89, 0x3b, 0x37, 0xd4, 0x9d, 0x5b,
|
||||
0x1e, 0x99, 0x3e, 0x94, 0x5a, 0xe4, 0x82, 0x86, 0x8a, 0x78, 0x34, 0x09,
|
||||
0x37, 0xd5, 0xe7, 0xb4, 0xef, 0x5f, 0x83, 0x94, 0xff, 0xe5, 0x36, 0x79,
|
||||
0x10, 0x0c, 0x38, 0xc5, 0x3a, 0x33, 0xa6, 0x7c, 0x3c, 0xcc, 0x98, 0xe0,
|
||||
0xf5, 0xdb, 0xe6, 0x81};
|
||||
static unsigned char p_data[] =
|
||||
{0x00, 0xf6, 0x61, 0x38, 0x0e, 0x1f, 0x82, 0x7c, 0xb8, 0xba, 0x00, 0xd3,
|
||||
0xac, 0xdc, 0x4e, 0x6b, 0x7e, 0xf7, 0x58, 0xf3, 0xd9, 0xd8, 0x21, 0xed,
|
||||
0x54, 0xa3, 0x36, 0xd2, 0x2c, 0x5f, 0x06, 0x7d, 0xc5};
|
||||
static unsigned char q_data[] =
|
||||
{0x00, 0xce, 0xcc, 0x4a, 0xa5, 0x4f, 0xd6, 0x73, 0xd0, 0x20, 0xc3, 0x98,
|
||||
0x64, 0x20, 0x9b, 0xc1, 0x23, 0xd8, 0x5c, 0x82, 0x4f, 0xe8, 0xa5, 0x32,
|
||||
0xcd, 0x7e, 0x97, 0xb4, 0xde, 0xf6, 0x4c, 0x80, 0xdb};
|
||||
static unsigned char dmp1_data[] =
|
||||
{0x00, 0xd1, 0x07, 0xb6, 0x79, 0x34, 0xfe, 0x8e, 0x36, 0x63, 0x88, 0xa4,
|
||||
0x0e, 0x3a, 0x73, 0x45, 0xfc, 0x58, 0x7a, 0x5d, 0x98, 0xeb, 0x28, 0x0d,
|
||||
0xa5, 0x0b, 0x3c, 0x4d, 0xa0, 0x5b, 0x96, 0xb4, 0x49};
|
||||
static unsigned char dmq1_data[] =
|
||||
{0x5b, 0x47, 0x02, 0xdf, 0xaa, 0xb8, 0xae, 0x8f, 0xbc, 0x16, 0x79, 0x6a,
|
||||
0x20, 0x96, 0x7f, 0x0e, 0x92, 0x4e, 0x6a, 0xda, 0x58, 0x86, 0xaa, 0x40,
|
||||
0xd7, 0xd2, 0xa0, 0x6c, 0x15, 0x6c, 0xb9, 0x27};
|
||||
static unsigned char iqmp_data[] =
|
||||
{0x00, 0xa0, 0xd6, 0xf0, 0xe8, 0x17, 0x9e, 0xe7, 0xe6, 0x99, 0x12, 0xd6,
|
||||
0xd9, 0x43, 0xcf, 0xed, 0x37, 0x29, 0xf5, 0x6c, 0x3e, 0xc1, 0x7f, 0x2e,
|
||||
0x31, 0x3f, 0x64, 0x34, 0x66, 0x68, 0x5c, 0x22, 0x08};
|
||||
|
||||
if (!TEST_ptr(bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new())
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(n = BN_bin2bn(n_data, sizeof(n_data), NULL))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(e = BN_bin2bn(e_data, sizeof(e_data), NULL))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(d = BN_bin2bn(d_data, sizeof(d_data), NULL))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(p = BN_bin2bn(p_data, sizeof(p_data), NULL))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(q = BN_bin2bn(q_data, sizeof(q_data), NULL))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(dmp1 = BN_bin2bn(dmp1_data, sizeof(dmp1_data), NULL))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(dmq1 = BN_bin2bn(dmq1_data, sizeof(dmq1_data), NULL))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(iqmp = BN_bin2bn(iqmp_data, sizeof(iqmp_data), NULL))
|
||||
|| !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, n))
|
||||
|| !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, e))
|
||||
|| !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D, d))
|
||||
|| !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1,
|
||||
p))
|
||||
|| !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2,
|
||||
q))
|
||||
|| !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_int(bld,
|
||||
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DERIVE_FROM_PQ, 1))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(fromdata_params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld)))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
cdata[0].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT1;
|
||||
cdata[0].comparebn = dmp1;
|
||||
cdata[1].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT2;
|
||||
cdata[1].comparebn = dmq1;
|
||||
cdata[2].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_COEFFICIENT1;
|
||||
cdata[2].comparebn = iqmp;
|
||||
cdata[3].pname = NULL;
|
||||
cdata[3].comparebn = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = do_fromdata_rsa_derive(fromdata_params, cdata, 512, 56, 64);
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
BN_free(n);
|
||||
BN_free(e);
|
||||
BN_free(d);
|
||||
BN_free(p);
|
||||
BN_free(q);
|
||||
BN_free(dmp1);
|
||||
BN_free(dmq1);
|
||||
BN_free(iqmp);
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(bld);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int test_fromdata_rsa_derive_from_pq_multiprime(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld = NULL;
|
||||
BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL;
|
||||
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *p2 = NULL;
|
||||
BIGNUM *dmp1 = NULL, *dmq1 = NULL, *iqmp = NULL;
|
||||
BIGNUM *exp3 = NULL, *coeff2 = NULL;
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM *fromdata_params = NULL;
|
||||
struct check_data cdata[12];
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* multiprime RSA key, extracted from this command,
|
||||
* openssl genrsa -primes 3 | openssl rsa -text
|
||||
* Note: When generating a key with EVP_PKEY_fromdata, and using
|
||||
* crt derivation, openssl requires a minimum of 512 bits of n data,
|
||||
* and 2048 bits in the FIPS case
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static unsigned char n_data[] =
|
||||
{0x00, 0x95, 0x78, 0x21, 0xe0, 0xca, 0x94, 0x6c, 0x0b, 0x86, 0x2a, 0x01,
|
||||
0xde, 0xd9, 0xab, 0xee, 0x88, 0x4a, 0x27, 0x4f, 0xcc, 0x5f, 0xf1, 0x71,
|
||||
0xe1, 0x0b, 0xc3, 0xd1, 0x88, 0x76, 0xf0, 0x83, 0x03, 0x93, 0x7e, 0x39,
|
||||
0xfa, 0x47, 0x89, 0x34, 0x27, 0x18, 0x19, 0x97, 0xfc, 0xd4, 0xfe, 0xe5,
|
||||
0x8a, 0xa9, 0x11, 0x83, 0xb5, 0x15, 0x4a, 0x29, 0xa6, 0xa6, 0xd0, 0x6e,
|
||||
0x0c, 0x7f, 0x61, 0x8f, 0x7e, 0x7c, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x04, 0x8b, 0xca, 0x44,
|
||||
0xf8, 0x59, 0x0b, 0x22, 0x6f, 0x3f, 0x92, 0x23, 0x98, 0xb5, 0xc8, 0xf7,
|
||||
0xff, 0xf7, 0xac, 0x6b, 0x36, 0xb3, 0xaf, 0x39, 0xde, 0x66, 0x38, 0x51,
|
||||
0x9f, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0xfc, 0xe4, 0x6f, 0x1a, 0x0f, 0x7a, 0xde, 0x7f, 0x0f,
|
||||
0x4e, 0xbc, 0xed, 0xa2, 0x99, 0xc5, 0xd1, 0xbf, 0x8f, 0xba, 0x92, 0x91,
|
||||
0xe4, 0x00, 0x91, 0xbb, 0x67, 0x36, 0x7d, 0x00, 0x50, 0xda, 0x28, 0x38,
|
||||
0xdc, 0x9f, 0xfe, 0x3f, 0x24, 0x5a, 0x0d, 0xe1, 0x8d, 0xe9, 0x45, 0x2c,
|
||||
0xd7, 0xf2, 0x67, 0x8c, 0x0c, 0x6e, 0xdb, 0xc8, 0x8b, 0x6b, 0x38, 0x30,
|
||||
0x21, 0x94, 0xc0, 0xe3, 0xd7, 0xe0, 0x23, 0xd3, 0xd4, 0xfa, 0xdb, 0xb9,
|
||||
0xfe, 0x1a, 0xcc, 0xc9, 0x79, 0x19, 0x35, 0x18, 0x42, 0x30, 0xc4, 0xb5,
|
||||
0x92, 0x33, 0x1e, 0xd4, 0xc4, 0xc0, 0x9d, 0x55, 0x37, 0xd4, 0xef, 0x54,
|
||||
0x71, 0x81, 0x09, 0x15, 0xdb, 0x11, 0x38, 0x6b, 0x35, 0x93, 0x11, 0xdc,
|
||||
0xb1, 0x6c, 0xd6, 0xa4, 0x37, 0x84, 0xf3, 0xb2, 0x2f, 0x1b, 0xd6, 0x05,
|
||||
0x9f, 0x0e, 0x5c, 0x98, 0x29, 0x2f, 0x95, 0xb6, 0x55, 0xbd, 0x24, 0x44,
|
||||
0xc5, 0xc8, 0xa2, 0x76, 0x1e, 0xf8, 0x82, 0x8a, 0xdf, 0x34, 0x72, 0x7e,
|
||||
0xdd, 0x65, 0x4b, 0xfc, 0x6c, 0x1c, 0x96, 0x70, 0xe2, 0x69, 0xb5, 0x12,
|
||||
0x1b, 0x59, 0x67, 0x14, 0x9d};
|
||||
static unsigned char e_data[] = {0x01, 0x00, 0x01};
|
||||
static unsigned char d_data[] =
|
||||
{0x64, 0x57, 0x4d, 0x86, 0xf6, 0xf8, 0x44, 0xc0, 0x47, 0xc5, 0x13, 0x94,
|
||||
0x63, 0x54, 0x84, 0xc1, 0x81, 0xe6, 0x7a, 0x2f, 0x9d, 0x89, 0x1d, 0x06,
|
||||
0x13, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0x02, 0x62, 0xb6, 0x7b, 0x7d, 0x7f, 0x1a, 0x92, 0x19,
|
||||
0x6e, 0xc4, 0xb0, 0xfa, 0x3d, 0xb7, 0x90, 0xcc, 0xee, 0xc0, 0x5f, 0xa0,
|
||||
0x82, 0x77, 0x7b, 0x8f, 0xa9, 0x47, 0x2c, 0x46, 0xf0, 0x5d, 0xa4, 0x43,
|
||||
0x47, 0x90, 0x5b, 0x20, 0x73, 0x0f, 0x46, 0xd4, 0x56, 0x73, 0xe7, 0x71,
|
||||
0x41, 0x75, 0xb4, 0x1c, 0x32, 0xf5, 0x0c, 0x68, 0x8c, 0x40, 0xea, 0x1c,
|
||||
0x30, 0x12, 0xa2, 0x65, 0x02, 0x27, 0x98, 0x4e, 0x0a, 0xbf, 0x2b, 0x72,
|
||||
0xb2, 0x5c, 0xe3, 0xbe, 0x3e, 0xc7, 0xdb, 0x9b, 0xa2, 0x4a, 0x90, 0xc0,
|
||||
0xa7, 0xb0, 0x00, 0xf1, 0x6a, 0xff, 0xa3, 0x77, 0xf7, 0x71, 0xa2, 0x41,
|
||||
0xe9, 0x6e, 0x7c, 0x38, 0x24, 0x46, 0xd5, 0x5c, 0x49, 0x2a, 0xe6, 0xee,
|
||||
0x27, 0x4b, 0x2e, 0x6f, 0x16, 0x54, 0x2d, 0x37, 0x36, 0x01, 0x39, 0x2b,
|
||||
0x23, 0x4b, 0xb4, 0x65, 0x25, 0x4d, 0x7f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x7f, 0x5d, 0xec,
|
||||
0x50, 0xba, 0xbb, 0xaa, 0x9c, 0x3c, 0x1d, 0xa1, 0x40, 0x2c, 0x6a, 0x8b,
|
||||
0x5f, 0x2e, 0xe0, 0xa6, 0xf7, 0x9e, 0x03, 0xb5, 0x44, 0x5f, 0x74, 0xc7,
|
||||
0x9f, 0x89, 0x2b, 0x71, 0x2f, 0x66, 0x9f, 0x03, 0x6c, 0x96, 0xd0, 0x23,
|
||||
0x36, 0x4d, 0xa1, 0xf0, 0x82, 0xcc, 0x43, 0xe7, 0x08, 0x93, 0x40, 0x18,
|
||||
0xc0, 0x39, 0x73, 0x83, 0xe2, 0xec, 0x9b, 0x81, 0x9d, 0x4c, 0x86, 0xaa,
|
||||
0x59, 0xa8, 0x67, 0x1c, 0x80, 0xdc, 0x6f, 0x7f, 0x23, 0x6b, 0x7d, 0x2c,
|
||||
0x56, 0x99, 0xa0, 0x89, 0x7e, 0xdb, 0x8b, 0x7a, 0xaa, 0x03, 0x8e, 0x8e,
|
||||
0x8e, 0x3a, 0x58, 0xb4, 0x03, 0x6b, 0x65, 0xfa, 0x92, 0x0a, 0x96, 0x93,
|
||||
0xa6, 0x07, 0x60, 0x01};
|
||||
static unsigned char p_data[] =
|
||||
{0x06, 0x55, 0x7f, 0xbd, 0xfd, 0xa8, 0x4c, 0x94, 0x5e, 0x10, 0x8a, 0x54,
|
||||
0x37, 0xf3, 0x64, 0x37, 0x3a, 0xca, 0x18, 0x1b, 0xdd, 0x71, 0xa5, 0x94,
|
||||
0xc9, 0x31, 0x59, 0xa5, 0x89, 0xe9, 0xc4, 0xba, 0x55, 0x90, 0x6d, 0x9c,
|
||||
0xcc, 0x52, 0x5d, 0x44, 0xa8, 0xbc, 0x2b, 0x3b, 0x8c, 0xbd, 0x96, 0xfa,
|
||||
0xcd, 0x54, 0x63, 0xe3, 0xc8, 0xfe, 0x5e, 0xc6, 0x73, 0x98, 0x14, 0x7a,
|
||||
0x54, 0x0e, 0xe7, 0x75, 0x49, 0x93, 0x20, 0x33, 0x17, 0xa9, 0x34, 0xa8,
|
||||
0xee, 0xaf, 0x3a, 0xcc, 0xf5, 0x69, 0xfc, 0x30, 0x1a, 0xdf, 0x49, 0x61,
|
||||
0xa4, 0xd1};
|
||||
static unsigned char p2_data[] =
|
||||
{0x03, 0xe2, 0x41, 0x3d, 0xb1, 0xdd, 0xad, 0xd7, 0x3b, 0xf8, 0xab, 0x32,
|
||||
0x27, 0x8b, 0xac, 0x95, 0xc0, 0x1a, 0x3f, 0x80, 0x8e, 0x21, 0xa9, 0xb8,
|
||||
0xa2, 0xed, 0xcf, 0x97, 0x5c, 0x61, 0x10, 0x94, 0x1b, 0xd0, 0xbe, 0x88,
|
||||
0xc2, 0xa7, 0x20, 0xe5, 0xa5, 0xc2, 0x7a, 0x7e, 0xf0, 0xd1, 0xe4, 0x13,
|
||||
0x75, 0xb9, 0x62, 0x90, 0xf1, 0xc3, 0x5b, 0x8c, 0xe9, 0xa9, 0x5b, 0xb7,
|
||||
0x6d, 0xdc, 0xcd, 0x12, 0xea, 0x97, 0x05, 0x04, 0x25, 0x2a, 0x93, 0xd1,
|
||||
0x4e, 0x05, 0x1a, 0x50, 0xa2, 0x67, 0xb8, 0x4b, 0x09, 0x15, 0x65, 0x6c,
|
||||
0x66, 0x2d};
|
||||
static unsigned char q_data[] =
|
||||
{0x06, 0x13, 0x74, 0x6e, 0xde, 0x7c, 0x33, 0xc2, 0xe7, 0x05, 0x2c, 0xeb,
|
||||
0x25, 0x7d, 0x4a, 0x07, 0x7e, 0x03, 0xcf, 0x6a, 0x23, 0x36, 0x25, 0x23,
|
||||
0xf6, 0x5d, 0xde, 0xa3, 0x0f, 0x82, 0xe6, 0x4b, 0xec, 0x39, 0xbf, 0x37,
|
||||
0x1f, 0x4f, 0x56, 0x1e, 0xd8, 0x62, 0x32, 0x5c, 0xf5, 0x37, 0x75, 0x20,
|
||||
0xe2, 0x7e, 0x56, 0x82, 0xc6, 0x35, 0xd3, 0x4d, 0xfa, 0x6c, 0xc3, 0x93,
|
||||
0xf0, 0x60, 0x53, 0x78, 0x95, 0xee, 0xf9, 0x8b, 0x2c, 0xaf, 0xb1, 0x47,
|
||||
0x5c, 0x29, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x47, 0x7f, 0xd0, 0x7a, 0x4e, 0x26, 0x7b, 0x47,
|
||||
0xfb, 0x61};
|
||||
static unsigned char dmp1_data[] =
|
||||
{0x01, 0x13, 0x3a, 0x1f, 0x91, 0x92, 0xa3, 0x8c, 0xfb, 0x7a, 0x6b, 0x40,
|
||||
0x68, 0x4e, 0xd3, 0xcf, 0xdc, 0x16, 0xb9, 0x88, 0xe1, 0x49, 0x8d, 0x05,
|
||||
0x78, 0x30, 0xfc, 0x3a, 0x70, 0xf2, 0x51, 0x06, 0x1f, 0xc7, 0xe8, 0x13,
|
||||
0x19, 0x4b, 0x51, 0xb1, 0x79, 0xc2, 0x96, 0xc4, 0x00, 0xdb, 0x9d, 0x68,
|
||||
0xec, 0xb9, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x3b, 0xae, 0x91, 0x7f, 0xb5, 0xd7, 0x36, 0x82,
|
||||
0x9d, 0x09, 0xfa, 0x97, 0x99, 0xe9, 0x73, 0x29, 0xb8, 0xf6, 0x6b, 0x8d,
|
||||
0xd1, 0x15, 0xc5, 0x31, 0x4c, 0xe6, 0xb4, 0x7b, 0xa5, 0xd4, 0x08, 0xac,
|
||||
0x9e, 0x41};
|
||||
static unsigned char dmq1_data[] =
|
||||
{0x05, 0xcd, 0x33, 0xc2, 0xdd, 0x3b, 0xb8, 0xec, 0xe4, 0x4c, 0x03, 0xcc,
|
||||
0xef, 0xba, 0x07, 0x22, 0xca, 0x47, 0x77, 0x18, 0x40, 0x50, 0xe5, 0xfb,
|
||||
0xc5, 0xb5, 0x71, 0xed, 0x3e, 0xd5, 0x5d, 0x72, 0xa7, 0x37, 0xa8, 0x86,
|
||||
0x48, 0xa6, 0x27, 0x74, 0x42, 0x66, 0xd8, 0xf1, 0xfb, 0xcf, 0x1d, 0x4e,
|
||||
0xee, 0x15, 0x76, 0x23, 0x5e, 0x81, 0x6c, 0xa7, 0x2b, 0x74, 0x08, 0xf7,
|
||||
0x4c, 0x71, 0x9d, 0xa2, 0x29, 0x7f, 0xca, 0xd5, 0x02, 0x31, 0x2c, 0x54,
|
||||
0x18, 0x02, 0xb6, 0xa8, 0x65, 0x26, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0x9b, 0x80, 0x90, 0xfc,
|
||||
0x75, 0x61};
|
||||
static unsigned char iqmp_data[] =
|
||||
{0x05, 0x78, 0xf8, 0xdd, 0x1c, 0x6f, 0x3d, 0xaf, 0x53, 0x84, 0x32, 0xa9,
|
||||
0x35, 0x52, 0xf3, 0xd0, 0x4d, 0xf8, 0x09, 0x85, 0x3d, 0x72, 0x20, 0x8b,
|
||||
0x47, 0xba, 0xc8, 0xce, 0xac, 0xd9, 0x76, 0x90, 0x05, 0x88, 0x63, 0x8a,
|
||||
0x10, 0x2b, 0xcd, 0xd3, 0xbe, 0x8c, 0x16, 0x60, 0x6a, 0xfd, 0xce, 0xc7,
|
||||
0x9f, 0xfa, 0xbb, 0xe3, 0xa6, 0xde, 0xc2, 0x8f, 0x1d, 0x25, 0xdc, 0x41,
|
||||
0xcb, 0xa4, 0xeb, 0x76, 0xc9, 0xdc, 0x8e, 0x49, 0x0e, 0xe4, 0x7c, 0xd2,
|
||||
0xd5, 0x6e, 0x26, 0x3c, 0x0b, 0xd3, 0xc5, 0x20, 0x4e, 0x4b, 0xb6, 0xf7,
|
||||
0xae, 0xef};
|
||||
static unsigned char exp3_data[] =
|
||||
{0x02, 0x7d, 0x16, 0x24, 0xfc, 0x35, 0xf9, 0xd0, 0xb3, 0x02, 0xf2, 0x5f,
|
||||
0xde, 0xeb, 0x27, 0x19, 0x85, 0xd0, 0xcb, 0xe4, 0x0a, 0x2f, 0x13, 0xdb,
|
||||
0xd5, 0xba, 0xe0, 0x8c, 0x32, 0x8b, 0x97, 0xdd, 0xef, 0xbc, 0xe0, 0x7a,
|
||||
0x2d, 0x90, 0x7e, 0x09, 0xe9, 0x1f, 0x26, 0xf2, 0xf4, 0x48, 0xea, 0x06,
|
||||
0x76, 0x26, 0xe6, 0x3b, 0xce, 0x4e, 0xc9, 0xf9, 0x0f, 0x38, 0x90, 0x26,
|
||||
0x87, 0x65, 0x36, 0x9a, 0xea, 0x6a, 0xfe, 0xb1, 0xdb, 0x46, 0xdf, 0x14,
|
||||
0xfd, 0x13, 0x53, 0xfb, 0x5b, 0x35, 0x6e, 0xe7, 0xd5, 0xd8, 0x39, 0xf7,
|
||||
0x2d, 0xb9};
|
||||
static unsigned char coeff2_data[] =
|
||||
{0x01, 0xba, 0x66, 0x0a, 0xa2, 0x86, 0xc0, 0x57, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x68, 0xb1,
|
||||
0x86, 0x63, 0x23, 0x5b, 0x0e, 0xeb, 0x93, 0x42, 0xd1, 0xaa, 0x15, 0x13,
|
||||
0xcc, 0x29, 0x71, 0x8a, 0xb0, 0xe0, 0xc9, 0x67, 0xde, 0x1a, 0x7c, 0x1a,
|
||||
0xef, 0xa7, 0x08, 0x85, 0xb3, 0xae, 0x98, 0x99, 0xde, 0xaf, 0x09, 0x38,
|
||||
0xfc, 0x46, 0x29, 0x5f, 0x4f, 0x7e, 0x01, 0x6c, 0x50, 0x13, 0x95, 0x91,
|
||||
0x4c, 0x0f, 0x00, 0xba, 0xca, 0x40, 0xa3, 0xd0, 0x58, 0xb6, 0x62, 0x4c,
|
||||
0xd1, 0xb6, 0xd3, 0x29, 0x5d, 0x82, 0xb3, 0x3d, 0x61, 0xbe, 0x5d, 0xf0,
|
||||
0x4b, 0xf4};
|
||||
|
||||
if (!TEST_ptr(bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new())
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(n = BN_bin2bn(n_data, sizeof(n_data), NULL))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(e = BN_bin2bn(e_data, sizeof(e_data), NULL))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(d = BN_bin2bn(d_data, sizeof(d_data), NULL))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(p = BN_bin2bn(p_data, sizeof(p_data), NULL))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(q = BN_bin2bn(q_data, sizeof(q_data), NULL))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(p2 = BN_bin2bn(p2_data, sizeof(p2_data), NULL))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(exp3 = BN_bin2bn(exp3_data, sizeof(exp3_data), NULL))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(coeff2 = BN_bin2bn(coeff2_data, sizeof(coeff2_data), NULL))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(dmp1 = BN_bin2bn(dmp1_data, sizeof(dmp1_data), NULL))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(dmq1 = BN_bin2bn(dmq1_data, sizeof(dmq1_data), NULL))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(iqmp = BN_bin2bn(iqmp_data, sizeof(iqmp_data), NULL))
|
||||
|| !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, n))
|
||||
|| !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, e))
|
||||
|| !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D, d))
|
||||
|| !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1,
|
||||
p))
|
||||
|| !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2,
|
||||
q))
|
||||
|| !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR3,
|
||||
p2))
|
||||
|| !TEST_true(OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_int(bld,
|
||||
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DERIVE_FROM_PQ, 1))
|
||||
|| !TEST_ptr(fromdata_params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(bld)))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
cdata[0].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT1;
|
||||
cdata[0].comparebn = dmp1;
|
||||
cdata[1].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT2;
|
||||
cdata[1].comparebn = dmq1;
|
||||
cdata[2].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_COEFFICIENT1;
|
||||
cdata[2].comparebn = iqmp;
|
||||
cdata[3].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT3;
|
||||
cdata[3].comparebn = exp3;
|
||||
cdata[4].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_COEFFICIENT2;
|
||||
cdata[4].comparebn = coeff2;
|
||||
cdata[5].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N;
|
||||
cdata[5].comparebn = n;
|
||||
cdata[6].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E;
|
||||
cdata[6].comparebn = e;
|
||||
cdata[7].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D;
|
||||
cdata[7].comparebn = d;
|
||||
cdata[8].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1;
|
||||
cdata[8].comparebn = p;
|
||||
cdata[9].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2;
|
||||
cdata[9].comparebn = q;
|
||||
cdata[10].pname = OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR3;
|
||||
cdata[10].comparebn = p2;
|
||||
cdata[11].pname = NULL;
|
||||
cdata[11].comparebn = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = do_fromdata_rsa_derive(fromdata_params, cdata, 2048, 112, 256);
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
BN_free(n);
|
||||
BN_free(e);
|
||||
BN_free(d);
|
||||
BN_free(p);
|
||||
BN_free(p2);
|
||||
BN_free(q);
|
||||
BN_free(dmp1);
|
||||
BN_free(dmq1);
|
||||
BN_free(iqmp);
|
||||
BN_free(exp3);
|
||||
BN_free(coeff2);
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(bld);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int test_evp_pkey_get_bn_param_large(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
@ -459,7 +851,7 @@ static int test_evp_pkey_get_bn_param_large(void)
|
||||
static const unsigned char e_data[] = {
|
||||
0x1, 0x00, 0x01
|
||||
};
|
||||
static const unsigned char d_data[]= {
|
||||
static const unsigned char d_data[] = {
|
||||
0x99, 0x33, 0x13, 0x7b
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1765,6 +2157,8 @@ int setup_tests(void)
|
||||
ADD_TEST(test_evp_pkey_ctx_dup_kdf);
|
||||
ADD_TEST(test_evp_pkey_get_bn_param_large);
|
||||
ADD_TEST(test_fromdata_rsa);
|
||||
ADD_TEST(test_fromdata_rsa_derive_from_pq_sp800);
|
||||
ADD_TEST(test_fromdata_rsa_derive_from_pq_multiprime);
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
||||
ADD_TEST(test_fromdata_dh_fips186_4);
|
||||
ADD_TEST(test_fromdata_dh_named_group);
|
||||
|
@ -348,6 +348,7 @@ my %params = (
|
||||
'PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MASKGENFUNC' => '*PKEY_PARAM_MASKGENFUNC',
|
||||
'PKEY_PARAM_RSA_MGF1_DIGEST' => '*PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST',
|
||||
'PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN' => "saltlen",
|
||||
'PKEY_PARAM_RSA_DERIVE_FROM_PQ' => "rsa-derive-from-pq",
|
||||
|
||||
# EC, X25519 and X448 Key generation parameters
|
||||
'PKEY_PARAM_DHKEM_IKM' => "dhkem-ikm",
|
||||
|
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user